There’s an Intelligent Defence of Intelligent Design
THERE’S AN INTELLIGENT DEFENCE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN
By Hendrik van der Breggen
(This article appeared as a Second Opinion in The Record, August 23, 2005)
President George W. Bush’s recent comments about public education and life’s origins have placed the intelligent-design movement squarely in the public eye. Should intelligent design be taught in science classes as an explanation of life’s origin, alongside evolution (where “evolution” is understood as involving no intelligent causes whatsoever), or not?
Having recently studied the question of intelligent design’s scientific status as a part of my PhD program in philosophy at the University of Waterloo, I would like to look at some popular philosophical objections to intelligent design and show that these objections fail. My hope is that by recognizing the failure of these objections the public and the scientific community will be more inclined to give intelligent-design theory a fair hearing.
Objection 1: Intelligent design is a failure because it merely fills in gaps in our present knowledge with an appeal to an intelligent cause, and these gaps will be filled with non-intelligent causes as we do more science.
Reply: This is known as the god-of-the-gaps objection and this objection unfairly represents intelligent-design theory. Intelligent design theorists do not argue, “I can’t see any solution to the problem, therefore a Higher Power did it.” Rather, proponents of intelligent design argue as follows: “The scientific community can see that, after years of trying, non-intelligent cause explanations demonstrably fail to account for phenomenon X; plus, the more we investigate X, the more we can see that the structure of X bears features that very clearly resemble the effects of known intelligent causes. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that an intelligent cause is responsible for X.”
In other words, the appeal to an intelligent cause is based on what we know, not on what we don’t know.
Incidentally, if we always hold out for a non-intelligent cause, in spite of contrary evidence, then we may fall prey to a naturalism- or atheism-of-the-gaps.
Objection 2: Intelligent design is not legitimate science because appeals to intelligent causes are not a part of the scientific explanatory enterprise.
Reply: This objection is false. In archeology the hypothesis of intelligent agency is readily available to explain the cause of, say, ancient cave paintings. Also, in forensic science the hypothesis of intelligent agency is readily available to explain “Who done it?” Was the death due to natural causes, or was it an accident, or was it designed (and thus a crime)? Also, in SETI (search for extra-terrestrial intelligence), the hypothesis of intelligent agency is available to explain radio signals that suggest intelligence.
Without the intelligent cause hypothesis, scientists who search for extra-terrestrial intelligence could in principle never recognize contact from ET, even if ET were to exist and communicated clearly.
Intelligent causes, then, are a legitimate part of the scientific explanatory enterprise. To stipulate that they can never come from outside the universe is to prejudge the data to fit a philosophical bias which rules out what might be the best explanation of that data.
Objection 3: Talk of “a cause of the universe’s beginning” lacks meaning; it’s nonsensical. To ask what caused the big bang assumes that the universe’s cause came “before” time, but time itself came into being at the big bang, so asking what caused the big bang is like asking, “What is north of the North Pole?” It’s absurd. So intelligent design is absurd.
Reply: This objection assumes that all causes precede their effects in time. But some causes are simultaneous with their effects — and this latter sense is all that is needed for intelligent design to remain within the realm of reason.
Think of a bicycle chain that moves the rear wheel sprocket. Or just consider the rear wheel sprocket moving the axle that moves the rear wheel. In these everyday cases there is simultaneous cause and effect. (In philosophical parlance, the cause is ontologically prior to the effect, but not temporally prior.) It’s not unreasonable, then, to think that time’s creation could occur simultaneously with its cause.
In other words, we are not asking something like “What is north of the North Pole?” Rather, we are asking something like, “What is above the North Pole?” Because such talk is not nonsensical, neither is intelligent design.
To better understand intelligent design theory as a scientific research program, I recommend the following book, even though I don’t agree with everything in it: William A. Dembski, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions About Intelligent Design, by InterVarsity Press.
Hendrik van der Breggen received his PhD last fall from the University of Waterloo philosophy department. He is an adjunct philosophy instructor at Emmanuel Bible College in Kitchener and at Heritage College and Seminary in Cambridge.

Kelly J. Wilson’s comment:
I am sympathetic to the criticism of ID as manifested in Objection 1. While I realize that my personal preferences aren’t relevant to the actual legitimacy of such an objection, I do wish to go beyond this discomfort and attempt to respond to your response.
Your response depends on the assertion that people are mistaken in their characterization of ID. You suggest that ID theorists do not argue “I can’t see any solution to the problem, therefore a Higher Power did it.” In other words, as you put it, ID theorists base themselves around what is known rather than what is unknown.
I think however, that forms of this statement (”I can’t see any solution to the problem, therefore a Higher Power must have done it.”) are fairly common. Perhaps it is cloaked in more respectable language, but I do believe this sentiment does inspire much of the ID literature.
Consider Bishop Hugh Montefiore or Birmingham, for instance, in ‘The Probability of God’, which is his attempt to bring Natural Theology up to date. He is characterized by Richard Dawkins as committing what Dawkins calls, the Argument of Personal Incredulity, thirty-five times in one chapter.
Thirty-five times in one chapter Montefiore puts his readers through statements that include “…there seems no explanation on Darwinian grounds…It is no easier to explain…It is hard to understand…It is not easy to understand…I do not find it easy to comprehend…I do not find it easy to see…”
Dawkins quotes one particularly torturous section where the Bishop writes:
“As for camouflage, this is not always easily explicable on neo-Darwinian premises. If polar bears are dominant in the Arctic, then there would seem to have been no need for them to evolve a white-coloured form of camouflage.”
To Dawkins, the Bishop might as well be saying:
“I personally, off the top of my head sitting in my study, never having visited the Arctic, never have seen a polar bear in the wild, and having been educated in classical literature and theology, have not so far managed to think of a reason why polar bears might benefit from being white.”
Dawkins then goes on to explain away that which is mysterious to the Bishop, and the Bishop, while certainly no intellectual slouch, is most definitely not the zoologist that Dawkins is.
The problem with the Bishop’s argument, and it is common in ID literature (perhaps you have a list somewhere distinguishing between those who use this argument and those who do not) is that it is not an argument, but rather an affirmation. It doesn’t answer, it marvels at the unexplainable.
This ‘argument’ is appealed too first, according to Dawkins, because there “is no intuitive grasp of the immensities of time available for evolutionary change.” Almost everyone is able to accept that minor variations occur within species, what creationists like to call ‘microevolution.’ Since the Industrial Revolution, one such example would be that dark coloration has emerged as a variety of moths. The change that we see in this example took place and 100 years later, it is very observable. As Dawkins notes, this is a long time for us, because it is longer than our own life span, but to a geologist, its about 1000 times shorter than a time that he would normally look at.
You suggest that ID theorists argue “The scientific community can see that, after years of trying…” Well, I believe that plays into Dawkins arguement.
The second argument comes from probability theory. Biological adaptations are not as a result of a single mutation usually, and so it seems rational when one considers a complex organ and the sequence of conditions that is essential for the success of this organ, to then turn to a Designer as opposed to opting for the random occurrence of such a series of coincidences that would bring about such a feat. Dawkins notes a couple of different problems with this concept, but centers around the fact that it is not true to say that each part by itself is useless. It does not follow that possession of a whole perfect work means it achieved simultaneously. As Dawkins notes, “Without an eye, you are totally blind. With half an eye you may at least be able to detect the general direction of a predator’s movement, even if you can’t focus a clear image. And this makes all the difference between life and death.”
Where there is half an eye, there is room for the mechanism(s) of evolution to do their work, if one is willing to be patient, and consider the power time holds over these processes.
It seems to me that ID theorists have not the patience to wait. Countless biological phenomenon’s have lasted for centuries only to be solved eventually. Similarly today the mysterious has not disappeared. Presumably though, some of the things that we cannot understand today, and so consequently pass on to the handiwork of the Creator, will in turn be solved naturally by future generations.
Thank you for an intelligent venue, at which these thoughts can be discussed.
Kelly Wilson
Hendrik’s first response:
Thanks, Kelly, for your thoughtful criticisms. Thanks, too, for your respectful tone. I need (and will take) some time to think about what you have written.
With best regards,
Hendrik
Hendrik’s second response:
Hello again Kelly,
I apologize for taking so long to respond to your comments. As you know, I recently started a new teaching position and it has been keeping me busy.
I want to begin by doing two things.
First, I want to reiterate the fact that I appreciate your respectful and friendly tone, in spite of the fact that we disagree. I think that even if intelligent design is ultimately a failure (which I am not quite ready to believe), it nevertheless has given us an opportunity to argue well. To argue well is to seek strong reasons for and against our positions, to be open to changing our minds in the direction of the best reasons, and to do all of this while showing respect to those with whom we disagree. I think that this kind of argument is an art that any truly civil society needs to nurture. If we can model that for others, then we’ve done something that’s important.
Second, I want to make a wee bit of clarification. When I write of the intelligent design (ID) movement, I am referring to those scientists, mathematicians, philosophers, and other scholars who are clearly central to that movement, i.e., the likes of Michael Behe, William Dembski, Stephen Meyer, Jonathan Wells, Scott Minnich, Phillip Johnson, etc. Many are fellows of the Discovery Institute’s Center for Science & Culture, and many of their works can be found at Access Research Network.
Okay, let’s argue.
My response to your first argument
In response to my claim that ID theorists do not argue “I can’t see any solution to the problem, therefore a Higher Power must have done it,” you object that forms of this argument are fairly common in, and inspire much of, the ID literature. And then you provide the work of Bishop Hugh Montefiore as an example of an ID theorist who presents 35 instances of (what Richard Dawkins calls) the Argument of Personal Incredulity (i.e., arguments that are predicated on “I do not find it easy to see…,” or “I do not find it easy to comprehend…,” etc.), which you say is really not an argument but a marvelling at the unexplainable. And then you bring Dawkins to the rescue to “explain away” what the Bishop can’t. After all, as Dawkins points out, ID theorists don’t have an “intuitive grasp of the immensities of time available for evolutionary change,” but, of course, Dawkins does.
At this juncture, two criticisms should be made of your argument thus far.
First, it may be true that Bishop Montefiore makes the Argument of Personal Incredulity, but the Bishop is not, as far as I am aware, a central player in the ID movement. Perhaps he is a central player in England, but I am quite confident that he isn’t in North America, which is where the ID movement hails. So the appeal to the Bishop might be a case of the fallacy of straw man (i.e., the mistake in reasoning whereby one wittingly or unwittingly misrepresents one’s opponent and then by knocking the straw version to the ground thinks one has done away with the real opponent). But I don’t want to put too much weight on this criticism, because my second criticism is more important.
Second, whether the Bishop is a central player in ID or not, the more charitable and accurate expression of the ID argument isn’t that of the Bishop—it’s that of the ID theorists in North America. And that argument has two parts (parts A and B below). And these are missed or misunderstood by Dawkins.
Part A looks a little bit like the Argument from Personal Incredulity, but is significantly different. It’s not: “Oh, I don’t find it easy to see any explanation.” Rather, it’s: “Hey, I’m a bona fide scientist and I’ve been studying this for a long time and no non-intelligent cause explanation is on the horizon or even near the horizon. Moreover, it’s not just me who is having the difficulty, it’s pretty much the whole discipline of which I am a part (as evidenced by the scientific journals). Moreover, many of us have a very good grasp of what evolutionary change can do in the time available since the earth cooled after the big bang. And, sure, large-scale evolutionary change is a logical possibility, but we’re interested in plausibility—that is, we’re interested in reasoning that is solidly based on good empirical evidence. But such reasoning and evidence show that neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory seems very much not to be plausible. So let’s consider other options. For starters, what does the empirical data suggest?”
Part B goes like this: “Whoah! The more we look at some structures that non-intelligent causes clearly have difficulty explaining (and if we don’t rule out ID on philosophical grounds before we look at the evidence), the more those structures smack of intelligent design. The structures are very much like computer programs or languanges or complex machines or factories — and in some cases much more complex and sophisticated than the computer programs, machines, etc. that we have created. We know from experience that computer programs, language, complex machines, and factories are produced by an intelligent cause (us). We also know (have pretty good grounds for believing) that very apparently no non-intelligent cause is up for the task to explain those similar structures we find in nature. So let’s consider ID as an explanation. Perhaps we’re not the only intelligent causes around — let’s allow the evidence determine whether or not we are.”
[Note 1: Even Dawkins admits that there are structures that smack of intelligent design. At the beginning of chapter 1 of his book The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins observes that “Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.” Of course, Dawkins thinks the appearance of design can be explained away by an appeal to non-intelligent causes. But many good scientists disagree, and the relevant scientific journals seem very much to support these scientists. For further substantiation, see the pages from my PhD dissertation, below.]
[Note 2: To allow ID into science is not to disallow non-ID explanations. ID would be a research program, not the research program. More than one research program can exist at the same time in science, it seems to me. Indeed, such competition would be healthy intellectually.]
To review: The ID argument has two sub-arguments. Sub-argument A tells us that there is a general failure in the relevant scientific disciplines in the attempt to explain many structures (what Behe calls “irreducibly complex structures”) in terms of non-intelligent causes. Sub-argument B tells us that the structures in question seem very much to be due to an intelligent cause because they have features that are clearly features of what we know are the effects of intelligent causes. The reasoning is similar to that of solving a crime: rule out the main competing explanation, and go with the one that the data strongly suggests.
Of course, we cannot rule out competing explanations absolutely, and we cannot prove a favoured explanation absolutely. We simply do the best we can and go in the direction that the evidence points us, fully aware that we could be mistaken and that more evidence could turn up in the future to show us that we were in fact mistaken. That’s science.
My response to your second argument
Your second argument has to do with probability. You follow Dawkins who (as you’ve described him) seems to hold that because each part of a complex organ is not useless by itself, this somehow makes it less improbable for the complex organ to evolve. The complex whole doesn’t have to have to be put together in one shot, and this makes the complex whole less improbable. You and Dawkins illustrate this with the claim that a half an eye provides evolutionary survival benefits over no eye, and this presumably will get us eventually, with time, a whole eye.
Here is my twofold response to your second argument.
First, I think that if, as neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory holds, the parts of a complex organism must be useful for other survival purposes before they have evolved into the complex organism in question, then, if there is not a simultaneous coming together of those parts, there would have to be immense evolutionary pressures on those parts to evolve in different directions, directions that are directly related to the survival of the parts as individuals, not to the survival of the individuals as a group. This, it seems to me, would make the evolution of the new complex organism highly improbable. Sure, it’s logically possible that the parts randomly converge in their survival functions from an individual mode to a group mode, but the issue has to do with probability and plausibility, not mere logical possibility. On the theory’s own lights, then, the probability argument seems very much to backfire.
Second, the story about the half eye turning into a whole eye (or a light sensitive spot growing into a full-fledged eye) is just that—a story. Dawkins is quite notorious for telling what has come to be disparagingly referred to as “Just-So Stories” (a term taken from Rudyard Kipling’s fictional children’s stories about how giraffes grew their necks, tigers got their stripes, etc.). Dawkins is telling interesting stories (logical possibilities) about evolutionary development, but much more needs to be done scientifically, surely. Scientifically plausible cases should be made based on evidence and good reasoning therefrom, not on mere storytelling.
I will recommend a short reading at this juncture: see Phillip E. Johnson’s “The Storyteller and the Scientist.” This essay is a very helpful review of Dawkins’ book Climbing Mount Improbable vis-à-vis Michael Behe’s book Darwin’s Black Box. Dawkins is the storyteller; Behe—an ID theorist—is the scientist. (This essay can be found in Phillip Johnson’s book Objections Sustained: Subversive Essays on Evolution, Law, and Culture, pp. 47-56.)
Here is a bit of what Johnson has to say about Dawkins (pp. 54-55):
“To move from Dawkins to Behe is like moving from the children’s library to the laboratory. Do you want to know how vision might have evolved? Because the biochemistry of vision is a black box to Dawkins, he can speculate without impediment. There are well over forty different types of eyes, which, because of their fundamentally differing structure, must have evolved (whatever that means) separately. Some of these eyes are much simpler than others. All an evolutionary storyteller has to do is start with the apparently simplest version, ignore the neural equipment that has to be present for an organism to make any use of a ‘photon receptor,’ and spin a charming tale about how a tiny, primitive light-sensing cell might grow up to be a full-fledged eye. That’s what Charles Darwin did in 1859, and Dawkins repackages the same story.
“Behe gives us just a bare start toward understanding what a biochemically informed evolutionary theory has to explain:
In other words (Johnson’s words):
“…Darwinian storytelling simply doesn’t work at the molecular level…. [Moreover, and very importantly for Dawkins’ stories,] the key point in Behe’s argument is that there are no papers in scientific journals that set out detailed, testable scenarios of how these incredibly complex biochemical systems could be produced by Darwinian-style processes.” [See below for further substantiation.]
End of quote from Johnson.
Much more can be—and should be—said. Here are a couple of pages from my “Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 2004; pp. 278-280, with footnotes deleted for the sake of space [I will add the book titles at the end of each quote that I make in my dissertation, and I will add one full footnote that occured at the end of the pages printed here]):
“For many in the contemporary scientific community, the deep mind affinity which the molecular machines [of the cell] very apparently display is explained away via neo-Darwinian evolution. According to evolutionary biologist Francisco Ayala, ‘It was Darwin’s greatest accomplishment to show that the directive organization of living beings can be explained as the result of a natural process, natural selection, without any need to resort to a Creator or other external agent.’ [Francisco J. Ayala, “Darwin’s Revolution,” in Creative Evolution?!, edited by John H. Campbell & J. W. Schopf (Boston: Jones & Bartlett, 1994), 4.] Significantly, however, the view that neo-Darwinian evolution successfully explains the origin of highly complex molecular machines, though a view held by many contemporary scientists, is not substantiated by the relevant contemporary science. As Behe correctly points out (to the shock of many),
“Behe’s observation is substantiated by other credible and respected scientists. For example, in a review of Behe’s work, microbiologist James Shapiro (who is not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design) writes:
“Also, evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne (who is also not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design) writes:
“Also, biochemist Franklin Harold (who is also not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design) writes:
“To buttress Behe’s position even further, the following comments from philosopher David Griffin are helpful (Griffin is also not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design but has investigated Behe’s claim that molecular evolution is not based on scientific authority, since, according to Behe, there is no publication in the scientific literature that describes how molecular evolution of any real, complex, biochemical system either did occur or even might have occurred):
End of quote from the main body of my dissertation.
Here is one of my dissertation’s footnotes which follows Griffin’s claim:
End of footnote.
All this to say that we shouldn’t be too quick to believe Dawkins’ stories.
Maybe someday one of Dawkins’ stories will be shown to be true. That it will be shown to be true or must be shown to be true is a matter of faith, it seems to me. I think that science should be based on evidence and good reasoning therefrom. If the evidence suggests intelligent design, and if non-intelligent causes are having loads of trouble, let’s also consider the ID hypothesis. It may end up failing, or it may not end up failing. Surely ruling it out at the starting gates by philosophical fiat is a closed minded approach to doing science. In the end, then, I think that science should let the world speak for itself — and ID, whether it ultimately fails or not, helps to ensure this.
Well I should stop. Thanks again, Kelly, for your thoughtful comments and the respectful and kind way that you presented them.
With best regards,
Hendrik
P.S. I should point out that the objection that we have been considering (i.e., objection 1 of my original article) actually is an objection made by Richard Dawkins and that’s why I wrote about it (i.e., he obviously influences a lot of people, so I thought a response to his objection was in order). Dawkins set out the objection in the preface to Niall Shanks’ book God, the Devil, and Darwin: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory (Oxford University Press, 2004). It’s been quite fitting, then, that we’ve been discussing Dawkins. For a look at another criticism of ID from Dawkins, see my last article on the home page of my “blog.” For more criticisms of Dawkins’ wider body of work, see Alister McGrath’s Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life (Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
P.P.S. The Discovery Institute has a helpful brief summary of The Scientific Controversy Over Whether Microevolution Can Account For Macroevolution, which should also help put Dawkins’ position is proper perspective.
Comment by Kelly J. Wilson — September 20, 2006 @ 8:09 pm
Gordon Burkett’s Comment:
I got here via the trackback from Kelly Wilson’s site. For some additional context, I will say up front that I *believe* that there is an intelligent designer. But that is very different from saying that science can demonstrate the existence or non-existence of a designer.
I find your first objection/response pair to be your weakest point. Perhaps it should be given such position of honor for some reason, but I think your post would have been better without it. As Kelly has demonstrated, almost any characterization of ID can be re-charaterized as “God of the gaps”. Any attempt to rebut this anti-ID argument is doomed to failure.
Your final comment (”Incidentally…”) has much more merit as a counter-point if not actual rebuttal. If we as humans (and scientists in particular) are indeed seeking truth and knowledge, then it makes no sense to require adherence to either side of the designer issue. We can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a designer - so we cannot falsify either hypothesis. So individual scientists should be encouraged to proceed with the hypothesis which they consider to be most promising in their research.
A major issue here, of course, is that the neo-darwinians have taken over the role played by the medieval churchmen in the Galileo fiasco. For all of the empty protestations about removing the heavy hand of dogma from science, the worst repressions we see these days are such as when Scientific American dismisses one of its long-time free-lance writers and the Smithsonian Institute stiffs one of its more prominent post-docs.
Your other objection/response pairs are excellent. This kind of clear-headed thinking and discussion are exactly what this contentious arena needs.
- Gordon
Hendrik’s first response:
Thanks, Gordon, for your thoughtful criticism. I will ponder what you’ve written. Thanks, too, for being civil.
With best regards,
Hendrik
Hendrik’s second response:
Hello again Gordon,
I apologize for taking so long to respond. Also, I would like to say again that I appreciate the respectful tone of your criticisms. On a deeply personal level, I am truly grateful. In addition, I would like to say that (as I mentioned to Kelly Wilson), whether ID is a failure or not, it’s important that we argue well—for the sake of nurturing civility in our world. It’s better to argue well with those with whom we disagree, than to “critique” them ad hominem or, worse, by bombin’em!
Okay. I have a few comments to make in response to your criticisms.
First, I think that my reply to Kelly Wilson’s argument (above) shows that the ID argument, when examined carefully, isn’t a god-of-the-gaps argument (and my reply isn’t “doomed to failure”). I hope that you will agree.
Second, I agree that, as you say, if we are seeking truth and knowledge, then “it makes no sense to require adherence to either side of the designer issue.” However, I disagree that, as you seem to imply, I am requiring adherence to either one side of the designer issue or the other. Much to the contrary, my project is much more modest: I am merely arguing that the ID hypothesis should be allowed into the pool of possible explanations as a contender, i.e., it shouldn’t be philosophically ruled out prior to the contest of handling the empirical evidence. If the evidence doesn’t warrant ID, then so be it. If it does, then so be it, too. But ID definitely shouldn’t be ruled out a priori merely because of a previously held philosophy (materialism/naturalism). And, I quickly add, ID also definitely shouldn’t be accepted prior to investigation merely because of a previously held philosophy (theism). Rather, and this is my main point: We should let the empirical evidence decide. In other words, I am promoting a philosophy (of investigative method) that lets the physical world speak for itself; I am not promoting a philosophy (of content) that tells the physical world what to say.
Third, you argue that “We can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a designer—so we cannot falsify either hypothesis.” I agree with your premise, but not completely with your conclusion. I agree with your premise because the notion of “proof” is so very strong and so ultimately cannot be achieved in the scientific context. The notion of “proof” applies to formal deductive logic and math, for sure. But it’s my understanding that in science we go with something weaker: we go with the best available empirical evidence and the best reasoning based on that evidence. Significantly, as it turns out, sometimes in science we can make a reasonable case for an intelligent designer: e.g., in archeology to explain a cave painting, in forensic science to explain a murder, in SETI to explain what might be an extraterrestrial intelligence. Now, it should be admitted that we cannot falsify these hypotheses absolutely, but it should also be noted that we do let evidence count in their favour or against them—so in that sense they can be tested or falsified.
Fourth, you write, “So individual scientists should be encouraged to proceed with the hypothesis which they consider to be most promising in their research.” I agree. If scientists find non-ID hypotheses to be promising—more promising than ID hypotheses—then these scientists should be encouraged to pursue their non-ID hypotheses as a research program based on empirical evidence and good reasoning therefrom. On the other hand, if other scientists find ID to be promising—more promising than non-ID hypotheses—then these scientists should be encouraged to pursue ID as a research program based on empirical evidence and good reasoning therefrom. Surely, the work of the latter scientists should not be ruled out as “nonscientific” by dogmatic proponents of a philosophy of science which will countenance only non-intelligent cause explanations (and does so inconsistently). Here’s the problem with ruling out ID on philosophical grounds, prior to investigation of evidence: To countenance only non-intelligent cause explanations is to artificially constrain theory selection in such a way that what might actually be the best explanation of the empirical data will be missed. In other words, if science is to be an honest truth-seeking endeavour, then we should let the world speak for itself—we shouldn’t gag it with philosophical duct tape.
Thanks again, Gordon, for your comments and criticisms—and for the respectful tone in which you presented them.
With best regards,
Hendrik
Comment by Gordon Burkett — October 16, 2006 @ 7:38 pm