I am no longer using this blog. Nevertheless, there are some articles and discussions here that are interesting and, I believe, important, so I hope you will take the time to explore this site. (Feel free to leave comments; however, I won’t guarantee that I’ll get to your comments right away.) My new blog is APOLOGIA by Hendrik van der Breggen, which can be reached via the link above and to the right.

Cheers,
Hendrik

I got here via the trackback from Kelly Wilson’s site. For some additional context, I will say up front that I *believe* that there is an intelligent designer. But that is very different from saying that science can demonstrate the existence or non-existence of a designer.

I find your first objection/response pair to be your weakest point. Perhaps it should be given such position of honor for some reason, but I think your post would have been better without it. As Kelly has demonstrated, almost any characterization of ID can be re-charaterized as “God of the gaps”. Any attempt to rebut this anti-ID argument is doomed to failure.

Your final comment (”Incidentally…”) has much more merit as a counter-point if not actual rebuttal. If we as humans (and scientists in particular) are indeed seeking truth and knowledge, then it makes no sense to require adherence to either side of the designer issue. We can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a designer - so we cannot falsify either hypothesis. So individual scientists should be encouraged to proceed with the hypothesis which they consider to be most promising in their research.

A major issue here, of course, is that the neo-darwinians have taken over the role played by the medieval churchmen in the Galileo fiasco. For all of the empty protestations about removing the heavy hand of dogma from science, the worst repressions we see these days are such as when Scientific American dismisses one of its long-time free-lance writers and the Smithsonian Institute stiffs one of its more prominent post-docs.

Your other objection/response pairs are excellent. This kind of clear-headed thinking and discussion are exactly what this contentious arena needs.

- Gordon

Hendrik’s first response:

Thanks, Gordon, for your thoughtful criticism. I will ponder what you’ve written. Thanks, too, for being civil.

With best regards,
Hendrik

Hendrik’s second response:

Hello again Gordon,

I apologize for taking so long to respond. Also, I would like to say again that I appreciate the respectful tone of your criticisms. On a deeply personal level, I am truly grateful. In addition, I would like to say that (as I mentioned to Kelly Wilson), whether ID is a failure or not, it’s important that we argue well—for the sake of nurturing civility in our world. It’s better to argue well with those with whom we disagree, than to “critique” them ad hominem or, worse, by bombin’em!

Okay. I have a few comments to make in response to your criticisms.

First, I think that my reply to Kelly Wilson’s argument (above) shows that the ID argument, when examined carefully, isn’t a god-of-the-gaps argument (and my reply isn’t “doomed to failure”). I hope that you will agree.

Second, I agree that, as you say, if we are seeking truth and knowledge, then “it makes no sense to require adherence to either side of the designer issue.” However, I disagree that, as you seem to imply, I am requiring adherence to either one side of the designer issue or the other. Much to the contrary, my project is much more modest: I am merely arguing that the ID hypothesis should be allowed into the pool of possible explanations as a contender, i.e., it shouldn’t be philosophically ruled out prior to the contest of handling the empirical evidence. If the evidence doesn’t warrant ID, then so be it. If it does, then so be it, too. But ID definitely shouldn’t be ruled out a priori merely because of a previously held philosophy (materialism/naturalism). And, I quickly add, ID also definitely shouldn’t be accepted prior to investigation merely because of a previously held philosophy (theism). Rather, and this is my main point: We should let the empirical evidence decide. In other words, I am promoting a philosophy (of investigative method) that lets the physical world speak for itself; I am not promoting a philosophy (of content) that tells the physical world what to say.

Third, you argue that “We can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a designer—so we cannot falsify either hypothesis.” I agree with your premise, but not completely with your conclusion. I agree with your premise because the notion of “proof” is so very strong and so ultimately cannot be achieved in the scientific context. The notion of “proof” applies to formal deductive logic and math, for sure. But it’s my understanding that in science we go with something weaker: we go with the best available empirical evidence and the best reasoning based on that evidence. Significantly, as it turns out, sometimes in science we can make a reasonable case for an intelligent designer: e.g., in archeology to explain a cave painting, in forensic science to explain a murder, in SETI to explain what might be an extraterrestrial intelligence. Now, it should be admitted that we cannot falsify these hypotheses absolutely, but it should also be noted that we do let evidence count in their favour or against them—so in that sense they can be tested or falsified.

Fourth, you write, “So individual scientists should be encouraged to proceed with the hypothesis which they consider to be most promising in their research.” I agree. If scientists find non-ID hypotheses to be promising—more promising than ID hypotheses—then these scientists should be encouraged to pursue their non-ID hypotheses as a research program based on empirical evidence and good reasoning therefrom. On the other hand, if other scientists find ID to be promising—more promising than non-ID hypotheses—then these scientists should be encouraged to pursue ID as a research program based on empirical evidence and good reasoning therefrom. Surely, the work of the latter scientists should not be ruled out as “nonscientific” by dogmatic proponents of a philosophy of science which will countenance only non-intelligent cause explanations (and does so inconsistently). Here’s the problem with ruling out ID on philosophical grounds, prior to investigation of evidence: To countenance only non-intelligent cause explanations is to artificially constrain theory selection in such a way that what might actually be the best explanation of the empirical data will be missed. In other words, if science is to be an honest truth-seeking endeavour, then we should let the world speak for itself—we shouldn’t gag it with philosophical duct tape.

Thanks again, Gordon, for your comments and criticisms—and for the respectful tone in which you presented them.

With best regards,
Hendrik

I am sympathetic to the criticism of ID as manifested in Objection 1. While I realize that my personal preferences aren’t relevant to the actual legitimacy of such an objection, I do wish to go beyond this discomfort and attempt to respond to your response.

Your response depends on the assertion that people are mistaken in their characterization of ID. You suggest that ID theorists do not argue “I can’t see any solution to the problem, therefore a Higher Power did it.” In other words, as you put it, ID theorists base themselves around what is known rather than what is unknown.

I think however, that forms of this statement (”I can’t see any solution to the problem, therefore a Higher Power must have done it.”) are fairly common. Perhaps it is cloaked in more respectable language, but I do believe this sentiment does inspire much of the ID literature.

Consider Bishop Hugh Montefiore or Birmingham, for instance, in ‘The Probability of God’, which is his attempt to bring Natural Theology up to date. He is characterized by Richard Dawkins as committing what Dawkins calls, the Argument of Personal Incredulity, thirty-five times in one chapter.

Thirty-five times in one chapter Montefiore puts his readers through statements that include “…there seems no explanation on Darwinian grounds…It is no easier to explain…It is hard to understand…It is not easy to understand…I do not find it easy to comprehend…I do not find it easy to see…”

Dawkins quotes one particularly torturous section where the Bishop writes:

“As for camouflage, this is not always easily explicable on neo-Darwinian premises. If polar bears are dominant in the Arctic, then there would seem to have been no need for them to evolve a white-coloured form of camouflage.”

To Dawkins, the Bishop might as well be saying:

“I personally, off the top of my head sitting in my study, never having visited the Arctic, never have seen a polar bear in the wild, and having been educated in classical literature and theology, have not so far managed to think of a reason why polar bears might benefit from being white.”

Dawkins then goes on to explain away that which is mysterious to the Bishop, and the Bishop, while certainly no intellectual slouch, is most definitely not the zoologist that Dawkins is.

The problem with the Bishop’s argument, and it is common in ID literature (perhaps you have a list somewhere distinguishing between those who use this argument and those who do not) is that it is not an argument, but rather an affirmation. It doesn’t answer, it marvels at the unexplainable.

This ‘argument’ is appealed too first, according to Dawkins, because there “is no intuitive grasp of the immensities of time available for evolutionary change.” Almost everyone is able to accept that minor variations occur within species, what creationists like to call ‘microevolution.’ Since the Industrial Revolution, one such example would be that dark coloration has emerged as a variety of moths. The change that we see in this example took place and 100 years later, it is very observable. As Dawkins notes, this is a long time for us, because it is longer than our own life span, but to a geologist, its about 1000 times shorter than a time that he would normally look at.

You suggest that ID theorists argue “The scientific community can see that, after years of trying…” Well, I believe that plays into Dawkins arguement.

The second argument comes from probability theory. Biological adaptations are not as a result of a single mutation usually, and so it seems rational when one considers a complex organ and the sequence of conditions that is essential for the success of this organ, to then turn to a Designer as opposed to opting for the random occurrence of such a series of coincidences that would bring about such a feat. Dawkins notes a couple of different problems with this concept, but centers around the fact that it is not true to say that each part by itself is useless. It does not follow that possession of a whole perfect work means it achieved simultaneously. As Dawkins notes, “Without an eye, you are totally blind. With half an eye you may at least be able to detect the general direction of a predator’s movement, even if you can’t focus a clear image. And this makes all the difference between life and death.”

Where there is half an eye, there is room for the mechanism(s) of evolution to do their work, if one is willing to be patient, and consider the power time holds over these processes.

It seems to me that ID theorists have not the patience to wait. Countless biological phenomenon’s have lasted for centuries only to be solved eventually. Similarly today the mysterious has not disappeared. Presumably though, some of the things that we cannot understand today, and so consequently pass on to the handiwork of the Creator, will in turn be solved naturally by future generations.

Thank you for an intelligent venue, at which these thoughts can be discussed.

Kelly Wilson

Hendrik’s first response:

Thanks, Kelly, for your thoughtful criticisms. Thanks, too, for your respectful tone. I need (and will take) some time to think about what you have written.

With best regards,
Hendrik

Hendrik’s second response:

Hello again Kelly,

I apologize for taking so long to respond to your comments. As you know, I recently started a new teaching position and it has been keeping me busy.

I want to begin by doing two things.

First, I want to reiterate the fact that I appreciate your respectful and friendly tone, in spite of the fact that we disagree. I think that even if intelligent design is ultimately a failure (which I am not quite ready to believe), it nevertheless has given us an opportunity to argue well. To argue well is to seek strong reasons for and against our positions, to be open to changing our minds in the direction of the best reasons, and to do all of this while showing respect to those with whom we disagree. I think that this kind of argument is an art that any truly civil society needs to nurture. If we can model that for others, then we’ve done something that’s important.

Second, I want to make a wee bit of clarification. When I write of the intelligent design (ID) movement, I am referring to those scientists, mathematicians, philosophers, and other scholars who are clearly central to that movement, i.e., the likes of Michael Behe, William Dembski, Stephen Meyer, Jonathan Wells, Scott Minnich, Phillip Johnson, etc. Many are fellows of the Discovery Institute’s Center for Science & Culture, and many of their works can be found at Access Research Network.

Okay, let’s argue.

My response to your first argument

In response to my claim that ID theorists do not argue “I can’t see any solution to the problem, therefore a Higher Power must have done it,” you object that forms of this argument are fairly common in, and inspire much of, the ID literature. And then you provide the work of Bishop Hugh Montefiore as an example of an ID theorist who presents 35 instances of (what Richard Dawkins calls) the Argument of Personal Incredulity (i.e., arguments that are predicated on “I do not find it easy to see…,” or “I do not find it easy to comprehend…,” etc.), which you say is really not an argument but a marvelling at the unexplainable. And then you bring Dawkins to the rescue to “explain away” what the Bishop can’t. After all, as Dawkins points out, ID theorists don’t have an “intuitive grasp of the immensities of time available for evolutionary change,” but, of course, Dawkins does.

At this juncture, two criticisms should be made of your argument thus far.

First, it may be true that Bishop Montefiore makes the Argument of Personal Incredulity, but the Bishop is not, as far as I am aware, a central player in the ID movement. Perhaps he is a central player in England, but I am quite confident that he isn’t in North America, which is where the ID movement hails. So the appeal to the Bishop might be a case of the fallacy of straw man (i.e., the mistake in reasoning whereby one wittingly or unwittingly misrepresents one’s opponent and then by knocking the straw version to the ground thinks one has done away with the real opponent). But I don’t want to put too much weight on this criticism, because my second criticism is more important.

Second, whether the Bishop is a central player in ID or not, the more charitable and accurate expression of the ID argument isn’t that of the Bishop—it’s that of the ID theorists in North America. And that argument has two parts (parts A and B below). And these are missed or misunderstood by Dawkins.

Part A looks a little bit like the Argument from Personal Incredulity, but is significantly different. It’s not: “Oh, I don’t find it easy to see any explanation.” Rather, it’s: “Hey, I’m a bona fide scientist and I’ve been studying this for a long time and no non-intelligent cause explanation is on the horizon or even near the horizon. Moreover, it’s not just me who is having the difficulty, it’s pretty much the whole discipline of which I am a part (as evidenced by the scientific journals). Moreover, many of us have a very good grasp of what evolutionary change can do in the time available since the earth cooled after the big bang. And, sure, large-scale evolutionary change is a logical possibility, but we’re interested in plausibility—that is, we’re interested in reasoning that is solidly based on good empirical evidence. But such reasoning and evidence show that neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory seems very much not to be plausible. So let’s consider other options. For starters, what does the empirical data suggest?”

Part B goes like this: “Whoah! The more we look at some structures that non-intelligent causes clearly have difficulty explaining (and if we don’t rule out ID on philosophical grounds before we look at the evidence), the more those structures smack of intelligent design. The structures are very much like computer programs or languanges or complex machines or factories — and in some cases much more complex and sophisticated than the computer programs, machines, etc. that we have created. We know from experience that computer programs, language, complex machines, and factories are produced by an intelligent cause (us). We also know (have pretty good grounds for believing) that very apparently no non-intelligent cause is up for the task to explain those similar structures we find in nature. So let’s consider ID as an explanation. Perhaps we’re not the only intelligent causes around — let’s allow the evidence determine whether or not we are.”

[Note 1: Even Dawkins admits that there are structures that smack of intelligent design. At the beginning of chapter 1 of his book The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins observes that “Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.” Of course, Dawkins thinks the appearance of design can be explained away by an appeal to non-intelligent causes. But many good scientists disagree, and the relevant scientific journals seem very much to support these scientists. For further substantiation, see the pages from my PhD dissertation, below.]

[Note 2: To allow ID into science is not to disallow non-ID explanations. ID would be a research program, not the research program. More than one research program can exist at the same time in science, it seems to me. Indeed, such competition would be healthy intellectually.]

To review: The ID argument has two sub-arguments. Sub-argument A tells us that there is a general failure in the relevant scientific disciplines in the attempt to explain many structures (what Behe calls “irreducibly complex structures”) in terms of non-intelligent causes. Sub-argument B tells us that the structures in question seem very much to be due to an intelligent cause because they have features that are clearly features of what we know are the effects of intelligent causes. The reasoning is similar to that of solving a crime: rule out the main competing explanation, and go with the one that the data strongly suggests.

Of course, we cannot rule out competing explanations absolutely, and we cannot prove a favoured explanation absolutely. We simply do the best we can and go in the direction that the evidence points us, fully aware that we could be mistaken and that more evidence could turn up in the future to show us that we were in fact mistaken. That’s science.

My response to your second argument

Your second argument has to do with probability. You follow Dawkins who (as you’ve described him) seems to hold that because each part of a complex organ is not useless by itself, this somehow makes it less improbable for the complex organ to evolve. The complex whole doesn’t have to have to be put together in one shot, and this makes the complex whole less improbable. You and Dawkins illustrate this with the claim that a half an eye provides evolutionary survival benefits over no eye, and this presumably will get us eventually, with time, a whole eye.

Here is my twofold response to your second argument.

First, I think that if, as neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory holds, the parts of a complex organism must be useful for other survival purposes before they have evolved into the complex organism in question, then, if there is not a simultaneous coming together of those parts, there would have to be immense evolutionary pressures on those parts to evolve in different directions, directions that are directly related to the survival of the parts as individuals, not to the survival of the individuals as a group. This, it seems to me, would make the evolution of the new complex organism highly improbable. Sure, it’s logically possible that the parts randomly converge in their survival functions from an individual mode to a group mode, but the issue has to do with probability and plausibility, not mere logical possibility. On the theory’s own lights, then, the probability argument seems very much to backfire.

Second, the story about the half eye turning into a whole eye (or a light sensitive spot growing into a full-fledged eye) is just that—a story. Dawkins is quite notorious for telling what has come to be disparagingly referred to as “Just-So Stories” (a term taken from Rudyard Kipling’s fictional children’s stories about how giraffes grew their necks, tigers got their stripes, etc.). Dawkins is telling interesting stories (logical possibilities) about evolutionary development, but much more needs to be done scientifically, surely. Scientifically plausible cases should be made based on evidence and good reasoning therefrom, not on mere storytelling.

I will recommend a short reading at this juncture: see Phillip E. Johnson’s “The Storyteller and the Scientist.” This essay is a very helpful review of Dawkins’ book Climbing Mount Improbable vis-à-vis Michael Behe’s book Darwin’s Black Box. Dawkins is the storyteller; Behe—an ID theorist—is the scientist. (This essay can be found in Phillip Johnson’s book Objections Sustained: Subversive Essays on Evolution, Law, and Culture, pp. 47-56.)

Here is a bit of what Johnson has to say about Dawkins (pp. 54-55):

“To move from Dawkins to Behe is like moving from the children’s library to the laboratory. Do you want to know how vision might have evolved? Because the biochemistry of vision is a black box to Dawkins, he can speculate without impediment. There are well over forty different types of eyes, which, because of their fundamentally differing structure, must have evolved (whatever that means) separately. Some of these eyes are much simpler than others. All an evolutionary storyteller has to do is start with the apparently simplest version, ignore the neural equipment that has to be present for an organism to make any use of a ‘photon receptor,’ and spin a charming tale about how a tiny, primitive light-sensing cell might grow up to be a full-fledged eye. That’s what Charles Darwin did in 1859, and Dawkins repackages the same story.

“Behe gives us just a bare start toward understanding what a biochemically informed evolutionary theory has to explain:

When light first strikes the retina a photon interacts with a molecule called 11-cis retinal, which rearranges within picoseconds to trans-retinal. (A picosecond is about the time it takes light to ravel the breadth of a single human hair.) The change in the shape of the retinal molecule forces a change in the shape of the protein, rhodopsin, to which the retinal is tightly bound. The protein metamorphossis alters its behavor. Now called metarhodopsin II, the protein sticks to another protein, called transducin. Before bumping into metarhodopsin II, transducin had tightly bound a small moleculre called GDP. But when transducin interacts with metarhodopsin II, the GDP falls off, and a molecule called GTP binds to transducin. (GTP is closely related to, but critically different from, GDP). (Darwin’s Black Box, pp. 18-20)

In other words (Johnson’s words):

“…Darwinian storytelling simply doesn’t work at the molecular level…. [Moreover, and very importantly for Dawkins’ stories,] the key point in Behe’s argument is that there are no papers in scientific journals that set out detailed, testable scenarios of how these incredibly complex biochemical systems could be produced by Darwinian-style processes.” [See below for further substantiation.]

End of quote from Johnson.

Much more can be—and should be—said. Here are a couple of pages from my “Miracle Reports, Moral Philosophy, and Contemporary Science” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Waterloo, 2004; pp. 278-280, with footnotes deleted for the sake of space [I will add the book titles at the end of each quote that I make in my dissertation, and I will add one full footnote that occured at the end of the pages printed here]):

“For many in the contemporary scientific community, the deep mind affinity which the molecular machines [of the cell] very apparently display is explained away via neo-Darwinian evolution. According to evolutionary biologist Francisco Ayala, ‘It was Darwin’s greatest accomplishment to show that the directive organization of living beings can be explained as the result of a natural process, natural selection, without any need to resort to a Creator or other external agent.’ [Francisco J. Ayala, “Darwin’s Revolution,” in Creative Evolution?!, edited by John H. Campbell & J. W. Schopf (Boston: Jones & Bartlett, 1994), 4.] Significantly, however, the view that neo-Darwinian evolution successfully explains the origin of highly complex molecular machines, though a view held by many contemporary scientists, is not substantiated by the relevant contemporary science. As Behe correctly points out (to the shock of many),

Molecular evolution is not based on scientific authority. There is no publication in the scientific literature — in prestigious journals, specialty journals, or books — that describes how molecular evolution of any real, complex, biochemical system either did occur or even might have occurred. There are assertions that such evolution occurred, but absolutely none are supported by pertinent experiments or calculations. [Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 185.]

“Behe’s observation is substantiated by other credible and respected scientists. For example, in a review of Behe’s work, microbiologist James Shapiro (who is not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design) writes:

In fact, there are no detailed Darwinian accounts for the evolution of any fundamental biochemical or cellular system, only a variety of wishful speculations. It is remarkable that Darwinism is accepted as a satisfactory explanation for such a vast subject — evolution — with so little rigorous examination of how well its basic theses work in illuminating specific instances of biological adaptation or diversity. [James A. Shapiro, “In the Details…What?” National Review, September 16, 1996, 64; the same point is also made in James A. Shapiro, “Genome System Architecture and Natural Genetic Engineering in Evolution,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 870 (May 18, 1999): 23-35, see especially p. 31.]

“Also, evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne (who is also not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design) writes:

There is no doubt that the pathways described by Behe are dauntingly complex, and their evolution will be hard to unravel. . . . We may forever be unable to envisage the first protopathways . . . . [Jerry A. Coyne, “God in the Details,” Nature 383 (1996): 227-228.]

“Also, biochemist Franklin Harold (who is also not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design) writes:

[W]e must concede that there are presently no detailed Darwinian accounts of the evolution of any biochemical system, only a variety of wishful speculations. [Franklin Harold, The Way of the Cell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 205.]

“To buttress Behe’s position even further, the following comments from philosopher David Griffin are helpful (Griffin is also not sympathetic to the idea of intelligent design but has investigated Behe’s claim that molecular evolution is not based on scientific authority, since, according to Behe, there is no publication in the scientific literature that describes how molecular evolution of any real, complex, biochemical system either did occur or even might have occurred):

The response I have received from repeating Behe’s claim about the evolutionary literature — which simply brings out the point being made implicitly by many others, such as [Francis] Crick, [Michael] Denton, [Robert] Shapiro, Stanley, Taylor, and Wesson — is that I obviously have not read the right books. There are, I am assured, evolutionists who have described how the transitions in question could have occurred. When I ask in which books I can find these discussions, however, I either get no answer or else some titles that, upon examination, do not in fact contain the promised accounts. That such accounts exist seems to be something that is widely known, but I have yet to encounter someone who knows where they exist. [David Griffin, Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 287, n. 23.]

End of quote from the main body of my dissertation.

Here is one of my dissertation’s footnotes which follows Griffin’s claim:

It should be pointed out that within the scientific community the majority of scientists disagree with Behe’s claim (supported by Shapiro, Coyne, Harold, and Griffin) that molecular evolution is not based on scientific authority. For a sampling of the growing body of work by critics who are scientists attempting to show that neo-Darwinian evolution can explain what has not yet been explained, see the following: Kenneth R. Miller, Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search for Common Ground between God and Evolution (New York: HarperCollins/Cliff Street Books, 1999); Kenneth R. Miller, “Answering the Biochemical Argument from Design,” in God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science, edited by Neil A. Manson (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 292-307; Kenneth R. Miller, “The Flagellum Unspun: The Collapse of ‘Irreducible Complexity,” in Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, edited by William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 81-97; Niall Shanks & Karl H. Joplin, “Redundant Complexity: A Critical Analysis of Intelligent Design in Biochemistry,” Philosophy of Science 66 (1999): 268-282; T. Cavalier-Smith, “The Blind Biochemist,” Trends in Ecology and Evolution 12:4 (1997): 162-163; Richard E. Lenski, Charles Ofria, Robert T. Pennock & Christoph Adami, “The Evolutionary Origin of Complex Features,” Nature 423 (May 8, 2003): 139-144; Robert T. Pennock, Tower of Babel: The Evidence against the New Creationism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999); Russel F. Doolittle, “A Delicate Balance,” Boston Review, February/March 1997, 28-29 (Boston Review is published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Doolittle’s article is a part of a symposium wherein Behe’s book and Dawkins’ Climbing Mount Improbable were discussed by scientists; Doolittle is a biochemist).

For Behe’s replies, see: Michael J. Behe, “Self-Organization and Irreducibly Complex Systems: A Reply to Shanks and Joplin,” Philosophy of Science 67 (March 2000); Michael J. Behe, “The Modern Intelligent Design Hypothesis: Breaking Rules,” Philosophia Christi 3:1 (2001): 165-179; reprinted under the same title in God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science, edited by Neil A. Manson (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 277-291; Michael J. Behe, “Irreducible Complexity: Obstacle to Darwinian Evolution,” in Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, edited by William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 352-370. For additional replies to Behe’s critics, see William A. Dembski, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2004). For a response by a microbiologist to recent scientific challenges to the flagellum’s irreducible complexity, see Scott Minnich’s lecture “Paradigm of Design: The Bacterial Flagellum” (Colorado Springs, Colorado/Santa Barbara, California: Access Research Network/University of California, 2003; DVD). And for a critical review of Pennock, see Joseph Poulshock, “Review of Tower of Babel: The Evidence against the New Creationism, by Robert T. Pennock,” Philosophia Christi 1:2 (1999): 149-151.

Some scientists also allege that, contrary to what Behe, Shapiro, Coyne, Harold, and Griffin claim, the scientific literature has already in fact explained the neo-Darwinian origins of irreducibly complex systems prior to the publication of the critics’ articles listed above. For examples, see: P. W. Atkins, “Review of Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box” ; and Bruce Weber, “Irreducible Complexity and the Problem of Biochemical Emergence,” Biology and Philosophy 14 (1999): 593-605. For Behe’s reply to allegations that the scientific literature has in fact already explained the neo-Darwinian origins of irreducibly complex systems prior to the publication of the critics’ articles listed above, see Michael J. Behe, “Irreducible Complexity and the Evolutionary Literature: Response to Critics,” Discovery Institute, July 31, 2000. In this online article, Behe points out that “Darwinian enthusiasts on the Internet” list at their websites large numbers of papers and books which purport to explain irreducibly complex systems in neo-Darwinian terms but in fact do not, and that these websites have been uncritically accepted by some, e.g., Atkins and Weber. As a sampling of the websites’ references show, the websites’ references have to do with either (1) works that have nothing to do with irreducible complexity (e.g., sequence comparisons) or (2) with works unrelated to the pertinent issues (because of unnoticed ambiguity of the words used in the computer searches). Quite correctly, Behe finds it more reasonable to go with the views of scientific reviewers of his book — respected scientists such as Shapiro, Coyne, Harold and others — who are antagonistic to his intelligent design proposal, are aware of the relevant science, and do not rely on unscholarly, shown-to-be-dubious websites.

End of footnote.

All this to say that we shouldn’t be too quick to believe Dawkins’ stories.

Maybe someday one of Dawkins’ stories will be shown to be true. That it will be shown to be true or must be shown to be true is a matter of faith, it seems to me. I think that science should be based on evidence and good reasoning therefrom. If the evidence suggests intelligent design, and if non-intelligent causes are having loads of trouble, let’s also consider the ID hypothesis. It may end up failing, or it may not end up failing. Surely ruling it out at the starting gates by philosophical fiat is a closed minded approach to doing science. In the end, then, I think that science should let the world speak for itself — and ID, whether it ultimately fails or not, helps to ensure this.

Well I should stop. Thanks again, Kelly, for your thoughtful comments and the respectful and kind way that you presented them.

With best regards,
Hendrik

P.S. I should point out that the objection that we have been considering (i.e., objection 1 of my original article) actually is an objection made by Richard Dawkins and that’s why I wrote about it (i.e., he obviously influences a lot of people, so I thought a response to his objection was in order). Dawkins set out the objection in the preface to Niall Shanks’ book God, the Devil, and Darwin: A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory (Oxford University Press, 2004). It’s been quite fitting, then, that we’ve been discussing Dawkins. For a look at another criticism of ID from Dawkins, see my last article on the home page of my “blog.” For more criticisms of Dawkins’ wider body of work, see Alister McGrath’s Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life (Blackwell Publishing, 2005).

P.P.S. The Discovery Institute has a helpful brief summary of The Scientific Controversy Over Whether Microevolution Can Account For Macroevolution, which should also help put Dawkins’ position is proper perspective.

Having read a draft of your [PhD] thesis, I’m with Jonathan. In my opinion, it was an intellectually dishonest piece of work, taking the views of a small minority of scientists and portraying them as mainstream, and avoiding mentioning critiques of those views.

In particular, Wells has been so thoroughly discredited that I don’t see how anyone with a shred of intellectual honesty can recommend him.

Hendrik’s response:

Hi Jeffrey,

You are welcome to your opinion about my PhD dissertation. However, I believe — along with my PhD dissertation examining committee — that your opinion is founded on poor reasoning. Also, I recommend that you do not judge a finished PhD dissertation on the basis of a pre-oral-defence draft, because by doing so you commit the fallacy of hasty conclusion. In my case, after the oral defence I took into account in my revisions any important but missed criticisms (of which there was only a very small number) to the satisfaction of my examiners.

For the record: In my dissertation I do not take the views of a small minority of scientists and portray them as mainstream, nor do I avoid mentioning critiques of the views of the scientists whose views I consider. Also, in my dissertation I account for most of your criticisms by refuting them with good arguments, and I take seriously your occasional good criticism (emphasis on the word occasional) by adjusting my dissertation accordingly. For your good criticisms I am grateful.

Regarding Wells, I think that my comment to Jonathan is satisfactory.

Best wishes only,
Hendrik

Read your article nov 14/05 in the article– laughable as all your others. In it you raise the statement, “The No 1 rule of science should be that we seek the best explanation of the evidence, period; we should not force the evidence to fit a philosophy”. Congratulations, Hendrik– you just defined science!! If you open up any elementary science text you will find science defined pretty much the way you said it. That’s the best thing about science– it has a built in failsafe system that allows it to be updated if and when new evidence comes along. The same is not true of religious dogma, because religious dogma is based on no evidence, only talk– and talk is cheap: just like philosophy. I recommend that you take a few pure science courses so you can learn a little bit about our natural world.

Hendrik’s response:

Hi Victor,

Thanks for your comments, though I think you should have proofread the first part of your first sentence prior to sending it, to avoid your laugh possibly backfiring because of a laughable typing error. (Article in the article? I think you mean article in The Record.) Okay, I’m being petty and a typing error is no big deal. I confess: I’m reacting emotionally to your insult about finding all my articles laughable (only the article titled “Fun with Names” is supposed to be funny!). But let’s skip the insults. I’m really glad that we’re in agreement about the definition of science—that’s truly important common ground. However, I think that you get sidetracked when you introduce the notion of religious dogma into the discussion. The argument in my November 14/05 article (in The Record ) is that science should be open to the possibility of intelligent design if that’s the direction the evidence points. So I’m not introducing “religious dogma,” that is, I’m not introducing a religious belief that’s held without evidence. I’m merely introducing the concept of intelligent design as a possible explanation in science if the evidence of the world is best explained by it. In other words, whether the intelligent design hypothesis is to be accepted depends upon evidence, not religion. The subsequent question of whether the intelligent designer has additional attributes, if any, that fit with a particular religious belief system is for philosophers, theologians, scientists, and people in general to figure out—via (hopefully) the use of good reasoning and any other evidence that might need to be examined.

Best regards only,
Hendrik

No one who is honest can recommend `Icons of Evolution’ by Wells. There is almost literally nothing correct in that text, and its only use is as propaganda for an agenda, used by people who aren’t particularly concerned about the truth of their arguments.

Hendrik’s response:

Hi Jonathan,

Although I appreciate your taking the time to read my article and leave a comment, I’m disappointed that you are so quick to accuse me of moral failure (which is a serious charge). You say “No one who is honest can recommend ‘Icons of Evolution’ by Wells.” I recommend it. Therefore, I must be dishonest. Surely, though, it’s possible that I’m honestly mistaken. Moreover, you don’t even know me yet you judge me on a deeply personal level. Clearly, you are much too quick to pass moral judgment on another person.

I am disappointed too at how readily you dismiss almost literally everything in Jonathan Wells’ book. Yes, I realize that there are many criticisms of Wells’ work (such as those in the link you provide). But I also realize that, in a controversial issue, both the pros and the cons should be taken into account on the scale of considerations, not just the cons. It turns out that I and many other philosophers and scientists have come to the conclusion that, even though Wells has many critics, the overall weight of the actual evidence plus the good reasoning therefrom favours Wells’ work. Of course, you and others are welcome to disagree. But you clearly go too far in dismissing Wells’ book to the extent that you do. Wells does in fact make quite a few good criticisms of evolution. In defence of my last point, I recommend (again) Wells’ book Icons of Evolution. I also recommend Wells’ reply to his critics: “Critics Rave Over Icons of Evolution: A Response to Published Reviews.”

With best regards,
Hendrik

Criticism 1: Intelligent design is not falsifiable or testable.

Reply: This is patently untrue. The intelligent design hypothesis predicts (retrodicts) that life’s origin is due to an intelligent cause, be it God or whomever. The hypothesis is falsifiable/testable because, in principle, evidence can be mustered to show that an intelligent cause was at work or not.

This is no more than `proof by assertion’.

Hendrik’s response (1 of 4): Hello Jonathan. No, this is not a mere “proof by assertion.” I go on to give reasons.

Jonathan’s comment continued:

Not just to be scientific, but to be a useful explanation for something, a real theory must be falsifiable. It must make useful predictions that can be tested and potentially be shown to be false. If it makes no predictions beyond its own statement, it simply has no use.

So you assert that Intelligent Design is falsifiable. So I ask you; please describe an experiment or measurement where one outcome would be evidence for Intelligent design, but another would convince you that Intelligent Design was false . Until you or other advocates can describe such an experiment, Intelligent Design remains unfalsifiable

Hendrik’s response (2 of 4): See my comments at the end.

Jonathan’s comment continued:

For those used to philosophical or theological thinking, this may seem a strange way to do things; an interesting idea may be worth following in its own right, regardless of its connection to an objective reality. But this idea that any useful theory must be powerful enough to potentially contain its own disproof is absolutely fundamental to science. Any idea which is not powerful enough to make testable predictions is not science. Maybe it’s interesting in a philisophical sense, but it is not science.

Your (largely quote-mined and taken out of context) quotes from scientists are largely of the form “we don’t know yet'’, which is exactly the `God of the Gaps’ argument. 100 years of biological investigation has produced far more knowledge about life and its origins than millenia of religious thought. The next 100 years will bring even more knowledge. Saying that something isn’t known today is not argument for intelligent design; and using `quotes’ to prove something is called `appeal to authority’.

Produce some evidence, and scientists will pay attention. Produce poor argumentation and fallacy, and you injure theology more than you injure science.

Hendrik’s response (3 of 4): I want to say a few words about your criticisms of my use of quotes. You charge me of taking a quote out of context. You seem not to realize, however, that to make your charge stick, you need to do much more than make a mere assertion. You need to substantiate your assertion by presenting good reasons for thinking that the meaning of the quote has changed significantly in the absence of its old surroundings. But you do not do this. So your charge doesn’t stick. Also, you charge me of making an appeal to authority as if by that fact alone I am making a fallacious argument. However, again you seem not to realize that you need to back up your charge with good reasons to take it out of the realm of mere assertion. In addition, you also seem not to realize that not all appeals to authority are fallacious. Some appeals to authority are legitimate from the point of view of critical thinking. So, again, your charge does not stick. For a good discussion of appeals to authority, see Ralph H. Johnson & J. Anthony Blair’s Logical Self-Defense (McGraw-Hill, 1994), 167-176. Trudy Govier’s A Practical Study of Argument (Wadsworth/Thomson, 2005), 141-145, is helpful too.

Hendrik’s response (4 of 4): Intelligent Design (ID) predicts that an intelligent agent brought about the origin of life, and, contrary to what you think, this prediction can be tested and potentially shown to be false. It’s in principle possible to falsify it (i.e., make a case against it) by showing that non-intelligent causes did it: e.g., chemical evolution. Interestingly, as my quotes give good reason to believe, attempts to falsify the ID hypothesis have failed—failed despite the facts that our scientists have great science educations, well-funded research laboratories, tenured appointments, plus decades of opportunity. That counts in favour of ID, surely at least in part. Why? Because the prima facie evidence of design remains. Think about it. The evidence on its face looks very much like it is designed—even Oxford University’s Richard Dawkins (a vehement opponent of ID) acknowledges the prima facie evidence of nature’s design when he describes biology as “the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.” (Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker [Harlow: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1986], 1.) However, the attempts to explain away this design fail, so design remains.

But there is more to consider besides the prima facie evidence for design. The ID hypothesis predicts not just that non-intelligent causes didn’t produce life’s origin but also that an intelligent cause produced it. We have seen that there is prima facie evidence for design. Now the question is: Does the evidence that non-intelligent causes very apparently can’t explain provide any positive evidence beyond mere apparent design for the effects of intelligence (that is, evidence for design that is stronger than the surface evidence)? Does, say, DNA have deeper features that only known intelligent agents have? Does, say, the cell’s interior have these features too? ID proponents contend that DNA’s code/language and the cell’s molecular machinery have features relevantly analogous to structures that are known to be designed by an intelligent cause. In fact, DNA’s language/code is more sophisticated than our best computer programs. In fact, the cell’s interior is a factory (some say city) with interconnected systems of intricate and complex machines. So the case for ID is not an argument from ignorance (i.e., from gaps in our knowledge), it’s an argument from what we know—it’s an argument based on what we know non-intelligent causes can’t do and on what we know intelligent causes can do.

Now, what might a test for ID look like? To answer this important question, I suggest that you look at the chapter “Testability” in William A. Dembski’s book The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design (InterVarsity Press, 2004), 280-290. Also, I suggest that you look at Access Research Network’s THE POSITIVE CASE FOR DESIGN.

I hope that the above is of some help to you.

With best regards,
Hendrik