The Record (Waterloo Region)
Second Opinion, November 14, 2005
Don't reject Intelligent Design without exploring evidence
[Scroll down to find criticisms of this article plus my replies.]HENDRIK VAN DER BREGGEN
Simon Singh, the popular science writer and author of the book Big Bang (Fourth Estate, 2004), recently spoke at Waterloo Collegiate Institute to celebrate the spirit of exploration that has given us Big Bang theory as the best explanation of our universe's origin.
A story by Rose Simone about his remarks (We Are a Curious Species) appeared in the Nov. 4 edition of The Record.
Like Singh, I'm excited about the Big Bang creation of the universe. It's truly amazing -- even awesome.
Also, I'm excited about the fact that it spurs our curiosity about important questions such as, What, if anything, caused the Big Bang?
As a philosopher, I think that such curiosity is a good thing: it helps us live the examined life, a life that would make Socrates smile. So kudos to Singh for his fine book (and kudos to Simone for her fine reporting).
However, I must say that I find it odd that, on the one hand, Singh celebrates the spirit of exploration that got us the Big Bang theory yet, on the other hand, flatly rejects any possible legitimacy for supernatural Intelligent Design explanations in the science of our world's origins.
According to Singh, science has a rule that bars supernatural Intelligent Design explanations from the pool of possible explanations, prior to any investigation.
The idea is that science allows natural explanations only. All other possibilities are forbidden.
The very history of Big Bang theory, however, undermines the wisdom of embracing any "rule" that dictates the outcome of an investigation.
A hundred years ago, before Big Bang theory was accepted, one of the philosophical assumptions or "rules" of science was that the universe was eternal, with no beginning or end.
It turns out that this "rule" was a major impediment to the early success of Big Bang theory.
Scientists were uncomfortable, philosophically, with deviating from it. Albert Einstein was uncomfortable with deviating from it because it raised the question of what came before the universe's beginning.
So Einstein and other scientists resisted. Happily, though, Einstein and other scientists eventually allowed the evidence to speak for itself and the result was our Big Bang theory.
Singh realizes all of the aforementioned Big Bang history, but apparently not its lesson.
Here's the lesson: The No. 1 rule of science should be that we seek the best explanation of the evidence, period; we should not force the evidence to fit a philosophy.
[There is a cartoon that illustrates the above lesson in a fun but deeply insightful way. The cartoon consists of a single frame. It depicts a large room that has wandering about inside a dozen men who look like Sherlock Holmes. They are examining the room’s nooks and crannies with their magnifying glasses, but to no avail. These inspectors are looking for clues to explain a very apparent death-by-crushing: on the floor there is a flattened human body that looks very much like it was stomped upon by an elephant. Interestingly, but completely ignored by the inspectors, there stands in the middle of the room a very large and guilty-looking elephant. The caption reads: “Scotland Yard always gets its man.”]
In other words, to celebrate the spirit of exploration, which makes science the powerful exploratory tool that it is, we should, as the history of Big Bang theory shows, be open and willing to go in whatever direction the evidence might point us.
Our knowledge of how the universe began depends on which way the evidence points us. Similarly, our knowledge of whether the universe's beginning involves a universe-transcending intelligent cause should also depend on which way the evidence points us.
This means that for science to be an honest truth-seeking endeavour, Intelligent Design should not be ruled out of the pool of possible explanations prior to an investigation of the evidence.
Of course, there are many questions that should still be asked of Intelligent Design.
For example, does Intelligent Design involve a conceptual error in its appeal to what might be a bodiless intelligent cause? Is the Intelligent Design hypothesis falsifiable or testable? Is there any good evidence to support the Intelligent Design hypothesis, or is it a god-of-the-gaps explanation? Does the question "Who designed the designer?" render Intelligent Design useless? Can Intelligent Design be a fruitful research program?
These are tough questions.
Nevertheless, I, along with a growing number of other philosophers and scientists, think that they can be given good answers -- answers that favour Intelligent Design. (For a look at some of the answers, see my web site: http://hendrik.blogsome.com)
Intelligent Design may, in fact, be a reasonable contender for those explanations of origins that appeal only to non-intelligent causes (or it might be a supplement for the latter explanations when they are tweaked somewhat in terms of their scope). Or not.
The point: The judgment that Intelligent Design is a contender or not should depend on evidence and good reasoning, not philosophical fiat.
In other words, the lesson from Big Bang theory is that we should celebrate the spirit of exploration by challenging any assumption or "rule" of science that might block evidence from speaking for itself.
Hendrik van der Breggen holds a PhD in philosophy from the University of Waterloo.
[Note: Due to space limits the cartoon about the elephant and the inspectors had to be editted out of the above article as it appeared in The Record. Thanks go to Dr. Michael Behe for the cartoon.]
--------------------------
Hendrik's replies to critics of the above article:
Mark Kennedy ("It's pseudoscience," The Record, November 16, 2005) writes:
...If ID is to be considered when investigating the origins of the universe, what sort of tests does the writer suggest scientists employ? What sort of "evidence" would point to the existence of an intelligent designer that isn't, ultimately, an appeal to ignorance?
ID's dismissal by most of the scientific community isn't based on closed-mindedness or a hostility toward "evidence" that might point to the existence of God, but the theory's inability to be proven false, just as phrenology, astrology and Freudian psychoanalysis aren't falsifiable or testable and have long ago been dismissed as pseudoscience.
Hendrik's reply:
Hi Mark. Please take a look at my second article on my home page in which I reply to my critics. See, too, my 4th reply to Jonathan Dursi's comment concerning that article. I hope the aforementioned will be of some help to you. Best regards.
+++
Bob Nixon ("No proof, so it's philosophy," The Record, November 16, 2005) writes:
...In science, theory must be empirically proven to become, as [Hendrik] puts it, a "rule." For this very reason, intelligent design, which is not proven, is not science, it is philosophy. That's why intelligent design must remain in the pulpit and out of the science class.
Hendrik's reply:
I agree 100% that a scientific theory requires empirical evidence to support it. However, I challenge the "rule" (i.e., assumption) that no intelligent cause explanations are allowed as possible explanations of the empirical evidence prior to investigation. That "rule" is an artifical constraint on theory construction that might keep us from the best explanation. My point is this: Let the empirical evidence speak for itself--don't muzzle it by only allowing non-intelligent-cause explanations. To rule or assume that intelligent cause explanations are not allowed in science is to make a naturalistic philosophy -- instead of empirical evidence -- determine the outcome of our investigations. I hope that this helps you understand what I'm getting at. Best regards.
+++
John Martin (“A common ground for science, spirituality,” The Record, November 22, 2005).
A. Introductory comments by Hendrik:
Let me begin by saying that I really appreciate John Martin for taking the time to think about the issues that I raised in my article of November 14th (see above). I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to John for the tone of his article: there is no hint whatsoever of personal animosity toward me and there is no hint whatsoever of disrespect for me as a person. Thank you, John, for modeling a lost art—the art of arguing with grace and respect toward those with whom one disagrees. You have put into practice a wise saying that I read some years ago in the work of the Christian philosopher Francis J. Beckwith: Be egalitarian with respect to people (because they are made in God’s image), be elitist with respect to ideas (because some are better than others). As we seek the best ideas via our use of good reasoning, we can encourage each other in the quest for truth by treating each other with decency. Thanks again.
For the sake of space (and to avoid possible copyright infringements) in what follows I will set out only those portions of John’s article with which I disagree, and then I will set out my reply. Of course, John’s article and my reply will make better sense if the reader has read my original article concerning Simon Singh in its entirety and John’s article in its entirety. My original article can be viewed above. John’s complete article can be viewed at http://www.therecord.com.
B. Portions of John Martin’s article and Hendrik’s replies:
I will look at excerpts from John’s article and immediately following those excepts I will present my comments.
Excerpt from John’s article:
In his Nov. 14 Second Opinion piece, Don't Reject Intelligent Design Without Exploring Evidence, Hendrik Van Der Breggen quotes Simon Singh, the popular science writer and author of the book, Big Bang:
"Science has a rule that bars supernatural Intelligent Design explanations from the pool of possible explanations, prior to any investigation."
Van Der Breggen then says, "The idea is that science allows natural explanations only. All other possibilities are forbidden."
We need to understand, however, that science defines itself by making the primary assumption that it will deal only with "natural" explanations as the cause of events which happen in the world.
Hendrik’s comment:
My first comment is a niggling criticism of a minor infelicity. You make it look like the words in quotation marks are a direct quote of Simon Singh’s words. Those are my words. I am indirectly quoting Singh. That is to say, I am merely reporting in my own words the gist of what Singh said. (Of course, it’s possible that the editors at The Record accidentally made you say something that you really didn’t say.) But, as I said, this is a niggling criticism, even though it does bother me if I’m made out to quote someone when I really didn’t (at least not directly).
My second comment is not a niggling criticism. You assert that “science defines itself by making the primary assumption that it will deal only with ‘natural’ explanations as the cause of events which happen in the world.” Please know that I realize this. This is the point that I am trying to challenge in my article. As I argued in my article, science’s naturalistic assumption is an assumption that, in some contexts (especially in the case of origins), may actually prejudge the outcome of the investigation—and so the assumption may very well hinder science in its discovery of truths. To illustrate with a historical precedent (whose lesson was lost on Singh), I pointed out that at one time science defined itself by making the primary assumption that it will deal only with explanations that fit with the assumption that the universe is eternal. It turns out that this assumption prejudged the outcome of investigations into the universe’s beginning. Indeed, as the history of Big Bang theory shows, this assumption thwarted scientific progress—it kept us from the Big Bang as the best explanation of the evidence that the world provides for us. I pointed out that the lesson to learn from the history of Big Bang theory is this: The No. 1 rule of science should be that we seek the best explanation, period; we should not force the evidence to fit a philosophy or assumption that determines the outcome of an investigation. In a sense, I am actually suggesting that science does fit a philosophy; however, it’s a philosophy that says, “let the world speak for itself”—it’s not a philosophy that predetermines the outcome of our investigations of the world. In other words, I’m basically setting out the same sort of criticism that is rightly made against those Christian folks who try to make science say what a very literal reading of Genesis says—I’m saying: Please don’t force the world to say what you want it to say; instead, let the evidence tell its own story. Now, in the context of origins, I’m saying to the naturalist: Please don’t force the world to say what you want it to say; instead, let the evidence tell us its own story. My point (again) is that science should be truth seeking, not just seeking the best natural explanation.
Perhaps the following cartoon illustration will help drive home my point. (The cartoon was edited out my original article for space reasons, but I’ve added it to my article as it’s displayed on my website.) The cartoon consists of a single frame. It depicts a large room that has wandering about inside a dozen men who look like Sherlock Holmes. They are examining the room’s nooks and crannies with their magnifying glasses, but to no avail. These inspectors are looking for clues to explain a very apparent death-by-crushing—on the floor there is a flattened human body that looks very much like it was stomped upon by an elephant. Interestingly, but completely ignored by the inspectors, there stands in the middle of the room a very large and guilty-looking elephant. The caption reads: “Scotland Yard always gets its man.”
If the universe was in fact created by an intelligent cause, and if there is evidence for thinking this is in fact the case, then the science of origins could help us discern that fact by allowing scientists to employ the hypothesis of intelligent design as a possible explanation. If we don’t allow the intelligent design hypothesis into science, then we may very well be much like the inspectors in the cartoon.
Excerpt from John’s article:
The academic disciplines of theology, religion and spirituality, on the other hand, make the primary assumption that there is a "higher" realm beyond the purely physical realm. Theology and spirituality will therefore talk about God as a cause of events that happen here on Earth.
Hendrik’s comment:
Yes, the academic disciplines of theology and religion and spirituality—Is “spirituality” an academic discipline? —make the assumption that there is a “’higher’ realm beyond the purely physical realm” and they “therefore talk about God as a cause of events….” But, we should pause and note, this is all really beside the point of my article’s argument. The point of my argument is that science should be truth seeking and therefore should incorporate the intelligent design hypothesis in its explanatory toolbox. Whether theology and religion and spirituality make an assumption about God’s existence (or whatever) is neither here nor there, at least neither here nor there in relation to my argument.
Now, keeping in mind that what follows is beside the point of my original article, I nevertheless would like to comment on theology, religion, and spirituality and the making of their primary assumption. It seems to me that granting the “primary assumption” as a given and keeping science-coupled-with-intelligent-design out of the picture has two undesirable consequences. First, it disconnects theology (etc.) from being grounded in the physical universe, thereby making it something of the order of interesting fiction, which may or may not have truth content. Second, because of this lack of grounding, it in effect says that in the realm of theology (etc.) anything goes. But what about, say, the religious group known as Heaven’s Gate? They assumed that suicide would get them onto the tail end of a comet. Or what about the Reverend Jim Jones and the mass suicide in Jonestown? Surely, some assumptions are better than others, that is, surely some assumptions fit the word better than others. This means that religious assumptions should be assessed and weighed against what the universe has to say—which is where the discipline of truth-seeking science, i.e., science which considers intelligent design, can help us. Moreover, we should think about the fact that many religions at their core contradict one another. If we simply grant assumptions without letting the world speak for itself, then there is no way to arbitrate between competing claims. Some religions are atheistic, some are not. Some hold that the universe is eternal, some not. Of course, we could change the competing claims and say that they don’t really say what they say and so they wouldn’t compete, and so we have some sort of universal or unified religion. But that would mean that we would be misrepresenting the world’s religions, which is to commit a fallacy in reasoning, plus it would mean that we would be deeply unfair to the adherents of the world’s religions, which is to commit a moral infraction. Also, the matter of the “unified religion” being disconnected from the universe would raise its head, if science continues without intelligent design. But this would bring us back to my original thesis: We should let science help us in determining whether there’s an intelligent designer by allowing science to have the conceptual tools to discern whether or not the universe is telling us that there is an intelligent designer.
Excerpt from John’s article:
While it is true that science as a discipline of study only deals with "natural" explanations for events that happen, this does not mean that "all other possibilities are forbidden" as Van Der Breggen suggests.
Hendrik’s comment:
I think that you may be interpreting what I wrote in a slightly inaccurate way. I wrote: “According to Singh, science has a rule that bars supernatural Intelligent Design from the pool of possible explanations. The idea is that science allows natural explanations only. All other possibilities are forbidden.” So I’m saying that, according to Singh, for science, or in science, all possible explanations other than natural explanations are forbidden. I’m not saying that, say, philosophical explanations are forbidden outside of science (although some persons who hold to something called scientism do forbid philosophical explanations, albeit inconsistently; see my Apologia column “Science versus Philosophy” for more on this). I hope that the above remarks provide some clarity.
Excerpt from John’s article:
We can think of science, psychology, sociology, theology and spirituality, etc., as being different "languages" for analysing or discussing the "same" phenomenon or reality. Each of these "languages" have words that are included in its vocabulary and words that are not included in the language of that particular discipline.
Hendrik’s comment:
To see an important problem with this “different languages” view, let’s do a thought experiment on the disciplines of science and theology. Suppose that in reality God exists and the phenomenon of reality is such that there is good evidence in the universe for thinking God exists. Theology (at least that of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) would tell us that the universe actually has an intelligent cause. However, science would tell us—because of its no-intelligent-cause-allowed-in-explanations assumption—that the universe has no intelligent cause. Clearly, one of the “languages” is no longer discussing the same phenomenon of reality, at least with respect to the universe’s origin. In this case, science is obviously out of touch, and to remedy the problem its vocabulary needs to be suitably expanded. End of thought experiment. I think that the case is similar in actual, not hypothetical, reality.
I should add that I am not saying that the vocabulary of science should be expanded to include the entire vocabulary of theology. Theology deals not just with beginnings but also with matters of special revelation, matters discerned and held by faith, not science. However, the vocabulary of science should be expanded to some minimal extent in the case of origins because there is in this instance a very apparent overlap between science and theology. Interestingly, empirical evidence points to an intelligent cause, and theology has predicted that this intelligent cause exists. Science can’t say much more about the cause except that it’s pretty intelligent and powerful and, when the universe’s origin is addressed, universe-transcendent. Theology goes on to “flesh out” the nature of this cause by means of, say, alleged scriptural revelation. In the case of Christianity, the New Testament’s alleged evidence for the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus would require careful consideration. In the case of Islam, the Qur’an’s alleged superior revelation would require careful consideration. And so on. (I think that the evidence in favour of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection makes the Christian revelation most reasonable to believe. But this is an issue that doesn't need to be discussed here. For more on this topic, see my article "Did the Easter miracle happen?")
Again: I’m not saying that the science-theology overlap is 100%. I’m merely saying that in the case of origins there is a tiny overlap. So there should be a common language to handle this overlap.
Excerpt from John’s article:
To suggest that science should be open to supernatural origins or to the possibility of God as a causative factor in the emergence of the universe is to ask that science use a word or category of thought that, by definition, is not in its vocabulary or frame of reference. Those of us who believe in God need to respect the vocabulary, parameters and categories of thought that science, by definition, has decided to take.
Hendrik’s comment:
I think that the above excerpt takes us back to the point and argument of my original article. I argued that the history of the Big Bang teaches us that we need to be wary of “rules” or assumptions of science that keep the universe from speaking for itself—i.e. those sorts of “rules” or assumptions we need not respect. One hundred years ago, the “rule” was that all scientific explanations had to fit the eternal universe model. But empirical evidence suggested otherwise. We now know that the universe began. We dumped the “rule” against finite universes. Today, the “rule” that empirical evidence speaks against is the “rule” that all scientific explanations have to fit the model that the universe, though it began, cannot have an intelligent cause to explain its beginning nor the beginning of life. It looks like we may be dumping the “rule” against intelligent causes. Importantly, what is challenging science is not some sort of illegitimate stepping across boundaries by those of us who believe in God; rather, what is challenging science is the empirical evidence that science is investigating—evidence that smacks of intelligent design. There is some important similarly in the case of the Big Bang beginning of the universe: What was challenging science was not those persons who believed in an eternal universe; rather, it was the empirical evidence that science was investigating—evidence that smacked of a beginning to the universe. To be sure, many in the intelligent design movement believe in God. However, their case isn’t argued on the basis of their religious beliefs; rather, their case is argued on the basis of empirical evidence and, as I have also argued, on how the history of science teaches us that sometimes science comes to better grips with empirical evidence by expanding its vocabulary.
Re: The rest of John’s article
John, I think that the rest of your article is great. You talk about science’s limited, descriptive role and hence its inability to provide deep meaning and and a foundation for ethics. We are in substantial agreement here, so I won’t add any additional comments.
With best regards,
Hendrik van der Breggen
+++
Comment from Richard Farrar (“Can you test the theory?”, The Record, December 1, 2005):
Farrar argues that “[p]hilosophical and metaphysical theories are empirically irrefutable” and (via an appeal to the philosopher of science Karl Popper) that both Darwinism and Intelligent Design are empirically irrefutable and hence are metaphysical theories. “Therefore,” Farrar would have us believe, “on the matter of origins, intelligent design and Darwinian evolution share a level metaphysical playing field and, in the absence of a true scientific alternative, both should be given a hearing.”
Hendrik’s comment:
Hi Richard. Thanks for your letter to the editor, and thanks for arguing in such a way that shows respect for those with whom you disagree. Even if you or I or others end up being 100% mistaken on the views we hold concerning Darwinism, Intelligent Design, etc., I think that if we can model how to argue respectfully, then we have truly provided a public service.
Okay, let’s take a look at your argument. I agree that both Intelligent Design and Darwinism should be given a hearing, but not because they are metaphysical theories. To be sure, they both have possible metaphysical implications and they both can therefore provide support (or non-support) for a particular metaphysical view (as, say, a part of a larger cumulative case argument). However, this does not detract from the fact that they both can remain properly within the realm of science. As I have explained elsewhere (see my second article on the homepage of this site), Intelligent Design can be falsified as can Darwinian evolution. This is not to say that these positions can be shown to be absolutely false; rather, it is to say that it is in principle possible to make a strong case against each of them, to such an extent that it is reasonable to eliminate each hypothesis on the basis of evidence. In other words, each can be tested via evidence and good reasoning therefrom. In my view, the preponderance of the evidence and good reasoning in fact favours Intelligent Design. Of course, non-intelligent-cause proponents disagree. However, and significantly, they often disagree not because the evidence is poor but because they (as Simon Singh illustrates) rule out the Intelligent Design hypothesis on the basis of a philosophical prejudgment instead of evidence. So, the playing field that we should be seeking is a scientific playing field, not a metaphysical one, and, to make it level, i.e., fair, we should, for starters, allow Intelligent Design into the game.
(For more discussion of the notion of falsifiability, see William A. Dembski, The Design Revolution: Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design [InterVarsity Press, 2004], chapter 39.)
I should also point out what seems to be an inconsistency in your argument. You say that both Intelligent Design and Darwinism are empirically irrefutable, and then you go on to say that both should be given a hearing. However, you seem not to notice that if they’re both empirically irrefutable, i.e., if evidence has no bearing whatsoever on their truth, then they’re both not worth bothering with. So they should not be given a hearing.
Best wishes, Hendrik.
+++